Wittgenstein’s Philosophy

Learning Outcomes:

1. Understanding the critique of private language in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy.
2. Exploring the relationship between meaning, use, and forms of life.
3. Grasping Wittgenstein’s notion of philosophy and his rejection of metaphysical inquiry.
4. Investigating Wittgensteinian fideism and its implications for religious belief.
5. Analyzing Wittgenstein’s epistemological insights in On Certainty.

Ludwig Wittgenstein’s contributions, particularly in his later works, have had a significant impact on 20th-century philosophy. Transitioning from the early Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus to his later Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein developed ideas that continue to be debated in both analytic and continental traditions. His thoughts on language, meaning, and knowledge resonate through various branches of philosophy, forming the backbone of discussions on epistemology, philosophy of language, and the philosophy of religion.

Critique of Private Language

Wittgenstein’s critique of private language is foundational to his later philosophy. It challenges traditional conceptions of meaning and the role of language in expressing internal states.

1. Private language definition: Wittgenstein defines a private language as one where terms refer to experiences only accessible to the speaker. Such a language, according to Wittgenstein, is incoherent because it lacks public criteria for correct usage. Language, for Wittgenstein, gains its meaning from the way it is used within a community of speakers.

2. The role of public rules: Meaning arises through shared practices. A private language would not be governed by rules understood by a community, and thus the notion of right and wrong usage would collapse. In a public language, the correctness of words like “pain” or “red” depends on observable behavior and social criteria, not on isolated introspective experiences.

3. The impossibility of private ostension: Wittgenstein argues that a private language would require an individual to perform private ostension — pointing to a sensation or experience to fix its meaning. However, this is impossible because ostension relies on shared understanding of reference, which can only occur in a public context.

4. Rejection of Cartesian dualism: In criticizing private language, Wittgenstein indirectly critiques Cartesian dualism. He opposes the idea that mental states are private, inner entities, separate from publicly observable behavior. For Wittgenstein, inner states do not exist as objects that we can point to; rather, they are expressed through behavior and woven into the fabric of human life.

Important Note: The critique of private language underpins Wittgenstein’s broader view that language is a social activity, deeply embedded in human forms of life. Without a community to validate usage, meaning would dissolve into incoherence.

Meaning, Use, and Forms of Life

In his later philosophy, Wittgenstein shifts the focus of meaning from a referential theory to one based on use, deeply connected to the notion of forms of life.

1. Meaning as use: Wittgenstein famously asserts that the meaning of a word is its use in the language. This principle stands in opposition to the traditional idea that meaning is the relationship between a word and the object it represents. Words are tools in a variety of human activities, and their meaning is not fixed by an abstract essence but by the way they are used in context.

2. Language-games: Wittgenstein introduces the concept of language-games to illustrate the diverse ways language operates in human life. A language-game includes both linguistic rules and the activities surrounding the use of language. Different language-games serve different purposes, such as giving orders, telling stories, or making requests. There is no overarching logic that governs all language-games; their meaning comes from their particular use in specific contexts.

3. Forms of life: Wittgenstein connects language with forms of life, which refer to the cultural, social, and biological practices that underpin human activities. Language does not stand apart from life; it is part of the web of human action. A form of life provides the background against which meaningful communication occurs. Different forms of life might produce different language-games, as seen in diverse cultural or scientific practices.

4. Contextualism: Wittgenstein’s contextualism emphasizes that words do not have meaning in isolation. Instead, their meaning emerges from their place in a language-game and the surrounding form of life. This dissolves many traditional philosophical problems, which Wittgenstein argues arise from misapplying language outside of its proper context.

Process-flow: “Language → Use → Context → Meaning”.

The Notion of Philosophy

Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy is distinctive, especially in its rejection of metaphysical theorizing and focus on clarifying language.

1. Philosophy as therapy: Wittgenstein sees philosophy as a therapeutic activity. Its goal is not to construct grand theories but to dissolve confusions that arise from misunderstandings of language. For Wittgenstein, many philosophical problems are rooted in linguistic confusion — applying words in contexts where they do not belong. Philosophy should clarify language use, allowing us to see conceptual problems dissolve.

2. Rejection of metaphysics: Wittgenstein’s approach leads to a rejection of metaphysical speculation. He argues that traditional philosophical inquiries into the nature of reality, such as the existence of universals or the nature of the mind, are misguided. These problems arise when language is misapplied — when philosophers try to use it outside the language-games for which it is suited.

3. Philosophy as description: Rather than seeking explanations or hidden structures behind the world, Wittgenstein suggests that philosophy’s task is descriptive. The philosopher should describe how language works in practice, mapping out the varieties of linguistic usage without imposing a rigid theory on them.

Important Note: Wittgenstein’s rejection of metaphysics distinguishes him from traditional philosophers. His emphasis on description over theory reflects a shift from system-building to problem-solving.

Wittgensteinian Fideism

Wittgenstein’s thoughts on religion have been interpreted as leading to a form of fideism, the view that religious beliefs are not subject to rational scrutiny.

1. Language-games and religion: Wittgenstein suggests that religious discourse operates within its own language-game. Religious beliefs, practices, and forms of expression are not to be evaluated by the criteria of scientific or empirical reasoning. Instead, they are part of a form of life that gives meaning to religious language within the context of a believing community.

2. The inaccessibility of religious meaning: For Wittgenstein, religious language cannot be judged by external, rational standards. It belongs to a specific language-game that is internal to the life of faith. From this perspective, atheistic critiques of religion based on the lack of evidence miss the point because they try to apply criteria from one language-game (scientific discourse) to another (religious discourse).

3. Religious belief as a commitment: Wittgenstein’s fideism implies that religious belief is more a matter of commitment and practice than propositional assent. Religious statements like “God exists” function differently than empirical claims. They express a form of life in which such belief is constitutive of the believer’s worldview.

On Certainty

Wittgenstein’s On Certainty, written near the end of his life, addresses fundamental issues in epistemology, particularly the nature of knowledge and doubt.

1. Hinge propositions: Wittgenstein introduces the concept of hinge propositions — basic beliefs that underlie all epistemic practices but are not subject to doubt. These propositions are the foundations of our worldview, such as “The earth has existed for a long time” or “I have two hands”. While they are not empirically verified, they are presupposed by all forms of inquiry.

2. The limits of doubt: Wittgenstein argues that doubt requires a context. Radical skepticism, which doubts everything, collapses because doubt itself depends on certain certainties. To doubt a particular fact presupposes that many other things are held as true. Thus, Wittgenstein suggests that certainty is not a result of evidence but is woven into the fabric of our forms of life.

3. Knowledge as practice: For Wittgenstein, knowledge is not an abstract accumulation of justified true beliefs but is rooted in the practical engagement with the world. Our certainties, which are often unspoken and unreflective, guide our actions and interactions within the world.

Important Note: Wittgenstein’s reflections in On Certainty represent a pragmatic turn in epistemology, emphasizing that certainty and doubt are functions of our lived practices rather than isolated epistemic states.

Comparative Overview: Wittgenstein vs Traditional Epistemology

MCQ: Wittgenstein’s notion of hinge propositions implies that:

1. All beliefs must be justified by evidence.
2. Some beliefs are foundational and not subject to doubt.
3. Radical skepticism is the best method of inquiry.
4. Certainty is irrelevant to knowledge. Correct answer: 2