Moore’s Philosophical Contributions: Sense and Reference, Refutation of Idealism, Defense of Common Sense, and Proof of an External World

G.E. Moore stands as one of the most pivotal figures in analytic philosophy, having deeply influenced the discourse on epistemology, metaphysics, and philosophy of language. This exploration will center on four key themes in Moore’s work: his distinction between sense and reference, his refutation of idealism, his defense of common sense, and his proof of an external world. Each of these contributions underscores Moore’s commitment to clarity, rigorous argumentation, and his defense of the ordinary against skeptical or idealist tendencies.

Learning Outcomes

1. Understand Moore’s distinction between sense and reference.
2. Analyze Moore’s arguments against idealism.
3. Comprehend Moore’s defense of common sense.
4. Explore Moore’s proof of an external world.

Distinction Between Sense and Reference

Moore’s engagement with philosophy of language, particularly in relation to the work of Gottlob Frege, involves a clear distinction between sense and reference. While Frege’s theory provided the groundwork, Moore’s analysis offered further clarification of these two distinct concepts.

1. Sense refers to the mode of presentation of a linguistic expression: For Moore, the sense of a term involves the way in which the object is conceived or the conceptual content attached to a term. It is not merely the object itself but the specific idea or description by which the object is understood. For example, in “the morning star” and “the evening star”, both terms refer to the same celestial object (Venus), but the sense differs in each case because of the differing modes of presentation.

2. Reference is the actual object to which a linguistic expression points: The reference concerns the real-world entity or object denoted by a term. This object remains constant even if the sense varies. For Moore, it was essential to distinguish the actual object referred to by a term from the idea or concept one might have of it. Hence, while “the morning star” and “the evening star” have different senses, they share the same reference.

3. Sense and reference must be distinguished to clarify philosophical misunderstandings: Moore believed that confusing sense with reference leads to many philosophical errors. One such error, often found in idealism, is the tendency to confuse perceptions of objects (sense) with the objects themselves (reference). By separating these, Moore could argue more effectively for the reality of the external world, independent of how we perceive it.

Important Note: Sense involves how we think of an object, while reference concerns the object itself. Misunderstanding this distinction leads to misrepresentations in both language and metaphysics.

Refutation of Idealism

One of Moore’s most famous contributions is his refutation of idealism. Idealism, especially as advocated by Berkeley and Hegel, claims that reality is fundamentally mental and that the external world does not exist independent of perception. Moore’s refutation is crucial in his defense of common sense and his realist ontology.

1. Moore’s rejection of the idealist premise: Idealists argue that we can only know our perceptions or sensations and not the external objects themselves. Moore counters this by distinguishing between our perceptions and the objects of those perceptions. He argues that the existence of external objects is not contingent upon our perceptions of them.

2. Moore’s use of the external world: He famously holds up his hands and claims, “Here is one hand, and here is another,” as a direct refutation of the idea that external objects depend on perception. For Moore, the simple and obvious fact that he can perceive external objects demonstrates their existence independently of any perceiver.

3. Common-sense realism: Moore’s defense of realism involves affirming the existence of objects outside the mind. He accuses idealists of making the mistake of equating our ideas of objects with the objects themselves. By emphasizing the distinction between the representation of objects and the objects themselves, Moore refutes the idealistic claim that objects are merely mental constructs.

Defense of Common-Sense

Moore’s defense of common sense is one of his most influential philosophical positions. He argued that ordinary beliefs about the world, such as the existence of physical objects, the reality of the past, and other basic beliefs, are fundamentally sound and should not be easily discarded by skeptical arguments.

1. Basic beliefs are self-evident truths: Moore famously outlined a list of “common-sense” propositions, such as “The Earth has existed for many years,” “There are other human beings,” and “There are material objects.” These propositions, Moore argues, are self-evident and require no philosophical justification. For him, the skeptic bears the burden of proof in attempting to refute these simple truths, rather than the common-sense realist needing to justify them.

2. Philosophy must align with common sense: Rather than contradicting everyday experience, philosophy should corroborate it. Moore believed that much of philosophy went astray by positing highly counterintuitive conclusions that contradict ordinary beliefs. Philosophers should not dismiss the truths that ordinary people take for granted, as these are likely closer to the truth than elaborate skeptical arguments.

3. Defense against skepticism: Moore’s common-sense philosophy is largely a response to the skepticism of philosophers like Descartes. By presenting common-sense beliefs as immune to radical doubt, Moore shows that it is far more reasonable to accept them than to entertain the hypotheses of extreme skepticism.

Process Flow: Common-sense → propositions → self-evident → defense → refutation of skepticism

Proof of an External World

Moore’s proof of an external world is often considered one of his most straightforward and yet deeply significant arguments in philosophy. Through this argument, Moore seeks to demonstrate that external objects exist independently of our perception and that we have knowledge of their existence.

1. The simple argument of hands: In his paper “Proof of an External World,” Moore famously asserts that he can prove the existence of external objects by simply holding up his hands and declaring, “Here is one hand, and here is another.” For Moore, the existence of his hands is an indubitable fact, and thus the existence of at least two external objects is confirmed.

2. Moore’s three conditions for proof: Moore’s proof hinges on three conditions:
   ●Premises must be different from the conclusion.
   ● The premise must be something that is known to be true.
   ● The conclusion must follow from the premise.

   Using these conditions, Moore argues that the statement “Here is a hand” fulfills all three, and thus proves the existence of the external world.

3. Criticism and defense: While Moore’s proof has been criticized as overly simplistic, its power lies in its simplicity. For Moore, the mere existence of ordinary objects we interact with every day is sufficient to demonstrate the reality of the external world. He resists the idea that philosophical proofs must be elaborate, instead favoring the obvious truths presented by our common experiences.

Important Note: Moore’s proof does not try to refute skepticism on its own grounds but instead affirms the existence of the external world by appealing to common experience and ordinary truths.

Comparative Table: Idealism vs. Common-Sense Realism

MCQ: What is Moore’s primary argument against idealism?
a) Objects do not exist independently of perception
b) Objects exist independently of perception
c) Perception is the same as objects
d) Idealism is a self-evident truth
Correct answer: b) Objects exist independently of perception

Moore’s contributions remain a cornerstone of analytic philosophy, providing a robust defense of realism, common sense, and the external world against the encroachments of idealism and skepticism. His work continues to be a foundation for contemporary discussions in epistemology and metaphysics.