Learning Outcomes:
- Gain a clear understanding of ethical cognitivism and non-cognitivism.
- Differentiate between the cognitive and non-cognitive approaches to moral judgments.
- Understand the implications of both theories on moral discourse and ethical reasoning.
- Explore key arguments, strengths, and weaknesses of cognitivist and non-cognitivist positions.
Ethical theories in modern Western philosophy are fundamentally concerned with the nature of moral judgments—whether they are expressions of objective truths or simply emotional reactions. The debate between ethical cognitivism and non-cognitivism is a central issue in meta-ethics, addressing whether moral statements are capable of being true or false, and how individuals engage with moral language.
Ethical cognitivism asserts that moral statements express propositions that can be true or false. It holds that when individuals make moral judgments, they are describing moral facts about the world. This theory suggests that moral properties—such as good, bad, right, or wrong—are real, and that moral statements are capable of being objectively evaluated.
1. Realism of Moral Facts: Ethical cognitivists claim that moral facts exist independently of individual feelings or social conventions. These facts are part of the fabric of the universe, much like mathematical or scientific truths. For instance, to assert that “murder is wrong” is to make a factual claim about the immorality of murder that can be true or false depending on its correspondence with the moral facts.
2. Truth-Aptness of Moral Statements: For cognitivists, moral statements possess truth-apt qualities. When someone says, “Stealing is wrong,” they are expressing a proposition that can be evaluated for its truth. Just as we can verify the claim “the sky is blue” by looking at the sky, we can assess the truth of moral claims by appealing to some form of moral reality.
3. Moral Knowledge: Cognitivism presupposes that individuals can have moral knowledge. It is possible, under this view, to engage in moral reasoning and arrive at true moral judgments. Cognitivists argue that moral disagreements often result from ignorance of moral facts or failures in reasoning, not from a difference in emotional reactions.
4. Objective Moral Standards: A central feature of cognitivism is its appeal to objective moral standards. According to this view, ethical principles are not contingent on individual preferences or cultural norms; they are binding and universal. This lends itself to the belief that moral disagreements can be rationally resolved through the discovery or recognition of moral facts.
5. Varieties of Cognitivism: Different branches of cognitivism include moral realism, where moral facts are robustly objective and independent, and constructivist cognitivism, which suggests that moral facts are not discovered but constructed through rational processes, such as the formation of moral systems or societal agreements.
Important Note: Cognitivists often rely on the idea that moral discourse resembles scientific discourse, where terms like “good” or “bad” function similarly to “hot” or “cold,” capable of objective verification.
In contrast to cognitivism, ethical non-cognitivism holds that moral statements do not express propositions capable of being true or false. Instead, non-cognitivists argue that moral judgments are expressions of emotions, attitudes, or imperatives. According to this view, saying “Stealing is wrong” is not making a claim about the world but is equivalent to expressing a feeling of disapproval or issuing a command not to steal.
1. Expression of Emotions: Non-cognitivism begins with the premise that moral language functions not to describe the world but to express emotions or attitudes. For example, when someone says, “Lying is wrong,” they are not stating a fact but rather expressing their emotional response to lying, similar to saying, “Boo to lying!”
2. Emotivism and Prescriptivism: There are different types of non-cognitivist theories. Emotivism, most famously advocated by A.J. Ayer and Charles Stevenson, asserts that moral language primarily serves to influence others’ emotions and motivate action. Prescriptivism, developed by R.M. Hare, emphasizes that moral statements function as imperatives or prescriptions. Under prescriptivism, saying “You should not lie” is akin to commanding or prescribing a certain action.
3. Moral Judgments as Non-Propositional: Non-cognitivists argue that moral statements do not possess truth value because they do not describe anything about the world. They do not represent facts and therefore cannot be true or false. In this sense, moral judgments are non-propositional in nature—they express attitudes rather than factual claims.
4. Avoidance of Moral Realism: Non-cognitivism rejects the realism about moral facts that cognitivism embraces. For non-cognitivists, there are no objective moral facts to discover, and moral debates cannot be resolved by appealing to some external moral reality. Instead, moral disagreements are seen as clashes of attitudes or preferences.
5. Focus on Language and Meaning: Non-cognitivist theories place a significant emphasis on the linguistic analysis of moral statements. They examine how people use moral language in everyday discourse, arguing that its primary function is to express approval or disapproval, not to state truths. This linguistic focus aligns with the philosophy of language movements in the 20th century.
Concept Flow: Emotions → Attitudes → Moral Language → Motivation
The differences between ethical cognitivism and non-cognitivism are pivotal in understanding their implications for moral philosophy. These distinctions are not just theoretical but also affect how one might approach moral reasoning, ethical debates, and moral education.
| Feature | Ethical Cognitivism | Ethical Non-Cognitivism |
|---|---|---|
| Truth-Aptness | Moral statements are capable of being true or false. | Moral statements do not express propositions and are neither true nor false. |
| Role of Moral Facts | Moral facts exist independently of individuals. | No objective moral facts; moral judgments express emotions or attitudes. |
| Nature of Moral Disagreements | Can be resolved through reasoning or discovery of moral facts. | Disagreements are expressions of differing emotions or attitudes. |
| Function of Moral Language | Descriptive and fact-stating. | Expressive and non-descriptive. |
| Examples of Theorists | G.E. Moore, J.L. Mackie, and Thomas Nagel. | A.J. Ayer, R.M. Hare, and Simon Blackburn. |
Both theories face critiques that challenge their conceptual foundations and practical implications in moral discourse.
1. Critique of Cognitivism: Critics argue that cognitivism overestimates the existence of moral facts. Skeptics like J.L. Mackie have introduced moral error theory, which holds that while moral discourse presupposes moral facts, no such facts exist. This leads to the conclusion that all moral judgments are inherently false. Additionally, cognitivism faces challenges in explaining the motivational force of moral judgments—why do people feel compelled to act in accordance with moral statements if they are simply descriptive?
2. Critique of Non-Cognitivism: Non-cognitivism is criticized for its inability to account for the apparent objectivity of moral discourse. People often speak and act as if moral statements are objective truths rather than subjective expressions. Moreover, non-cognitivism struggles to explain the rationality of moral discourse—how can we argue or reason about moral issues if they are just expressions of emotional states? Critics suggest that non-cognitivism fails to capture the full depth of moral experience.
Important Note: Some philosophers propose a middle ground in the form of quasi-realism, where moral language behaves as if it is truth-apt, even though it is rooted in non-cognitive expressions.
The debate between cognitivism and non-cognitivism has far-reaching implications for how we understand moral responsibility, ethical education, and moral discourse. For cognitivists, moral judgments are grounded in the pursuit of truth and objective values, providing a stable foundation for moral debate and ethical reasoning. Non-cognitivists, on the other hand, highlight the expressive nature of moral language, focusing on its ability to motivate action and express shared societal values.
MCQ: Which of the following best describes ethical non-cognitivism? A) Moral statements express objective truths. B) Moral judgments are neither true nor false but express attitudes. C) Moral disagreements can be resolved by discovering moral facts. D) Moral knowledge is attainable through reasoning.
Correct Answer: B