H.P. Grice and P.F. Strawson: In Defense of a Dogma

Learning Outcomes

1. Understand the central argument presented by Grice and Strawson in defense of the analytic-synthetic distinction.
2. Explore the implications of the critique of Quine’s rejection of the distinction.
3. Examine the methodological differences between Grice-Strawson and Quine.
4. Analyze the broader implications of this debate in the context of analytic philosophy.

The philosophical paper In Defense of a Dogma by H.P. Grice and P.F. Strawson stands as a critical response to W.V.O. Quine’s earlier argument against the distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions. Published in 1956, Grice and Strawson seek to defend a dogma of modern analytic philosophy: the belief that there is a principled distinction between analytic truths (truths by virtue of meaning) and synthetic truths (truths by virtue of facts). This debate is pivotal within recent Western philosophy, particularly the analytic tradition, as it pertains to epistemology and the philosophy of language.

Quine’s Challenge to the Analytic-Synthetic Distinction

In his 1951 paper, Two Dogmas of Empiricism, Quine mounted a powerful critique of two central tenets of logical positivism. The first of these tenets is the distinction between analytic and synthetic statements, and the second is reductionism (the idea that every meaningful statement can be translated into a logical construction based on immediate experience). Quine’s rejection of the analytic-synthetic distinction is based on two main points:

1. No clear definition of analyticity: Quine argued that philosophers had failed to provide a satisfactory and non-circular definition of what it means for a statement to be analytic.

2. Empirical holism: He claimed that there is no meaningful way to isolate a single statement and classify it as analytic or synthetic because the truth of any statement depends on the entirety of our empirical framework.

Grice and Strawson’s paper directly addresses Quine’s arguments, aiming to refute them by defending the coherence of the analytic-synthetic distinction.

The Argument of Grice and Strawson

Grice and Strawson argue that Quine’s critique rests on a misunderstanding or misrepresentation of the nature of the analytic-synthetic distinction. Their response is structured as a defense of the common-sense view that the distinction is intelligible and useful in philosophical analysis. To systematically respond to Quine, they proceed through a series of logical steps, which can be broken down as follows:

1. Clarifying the Concept of Analyticity:
   Grice and Strawson begin by acknowledging that providing a precise, formal definition of analyticity may indeed be challenging. However, they argue that this difficulty does not imply that the concept is illegitimate. They suggest that many concepts used in philosophy and everyday life—such as ‘meaning’ itself—are similarly difficult to define in a non-circular way but are still valid and useful. For Grice and Strawson, Quine’s demand for a non-circular definition of analyticity places an unreasonable burden on the concept.

2. The Practical Utility of the Distinction:
   They next focus on the pragmatic importance of the analytic-synthetic distinction. Analytic propositions, such as All bachelors are unmarried, are true in virtue of their meaning alone and do not require empirical verification. Synthetic propositions, like Bachelors are unhappy, require empirical investigation for their truth. According to Grice and Strawson, this distinction is intuitively clear and widely used in both linguistic analysis and scientific reasoning.

3. Challenging Quine’s Holism:
   One of the central claims in Quine’s rejection of the distinction is that any statement’s truth is a function of the entire web of beliefs, not isolated in terms of being analytic or synthetic. Grice and Strawson counter this by arguing that Quine’s holism is exaggerated. While they concede that empirical beliefs can be interconnected, they maintain that some propositions, especially those concerning meanings of words, remain true or false independently of our empirical knowledge. For example, the truth of All squares are rectangles does not depend on the entirety of scientific knowledge but is analytic by virtue of the definitions of ‘square’ and ‘rectangle.’

4. The Appeal to Common-Sense Notions of Meaning:
   Grice and Strawson stress that rejecting the analytic-synthetic distinction entails rejecting common-sense intuitions about language and meaning. They argue that the distinction is not merely a philosophical artifact but something embedded in ordinary linguistic practices. For instance, when we learn the meaning of a word or the logical structure of a sentence, we are implicitly engaging with analytic truths, regardless of whether we can offer a non-circular definition of analyticity.

5. Analyticity as a Theoretical Concept:
   They also argue that analyticity, much like the concept of necessity or causality, should be viewed as a theoretical construct that aids in understanding the structure of language and logic. Just because a theoretical concept is difficult to define, it does not follow that it should be abandoned. In this way, they analogize analyticity to concepts in the natural sciences, where terms like ‘energy’ or ‘gravity’ are not abandoned simply because they resist simple, non-circular definitions.

Important Note: Grice and Strawson emphasize that the utility of the analytic-synthetic distinction lies in its explanatory power rather than in its definition. This reflects a broader methodological point in philosophy, where conceptual tools are evaluated based on their capacity to clarify and organize thought, rather than on their precise formal definitions.

Methodological Differences Between Quine and Grice-Strawson

The dispute between Quine and Grice-Strawson is not simply about the analytic-synthetic distinction; it also reflects deeper methodological differences in their approach to philosophy of language. These differences can be captured in several points:

1. Empirical Foundations vs. Conceptual Clarity:
   Quine, with his empiricist leanings, sought to ground philosophical analysis in a scientific view of the world, where meaning and truth are subject to empirical revision. For him, the boundaries between analytic and synthetic were blurred because all knowledge is revisable in light of experience. In contrast, Grice and Strawson held that some concepts, especially those tied to meaning, could be understood without empirical considerations.

2. Holism vs. Modularity:
   Quine’s view of holism implies that individual sentences cannot be evaluated independently of an entire theory or network of beliefs. For Grice and Strawson, however, certain propositions (especially analytic ones) remain true or false in isolation, and this modularity is a key feature of language.

3. Philosophical Conservatism vs. Radicalism:
   Grice and Strawson can be seen as defending a more conservative view of philosophy, in which established concepts such as analyticity are retained because of their practical utility. Quine, by contrast, is a more radical thinker, willing to discard traditional distinctions if they no longer seem useful in light of scientific progress.

Broader Implications for Analytic Philosophy

The debate between Grice, Strawson, and Quine has significant implications for the trajectory of analytic philosophy in the 20th century. In particular:

1. The Role of Language in Philosophy:
   This debate underscores the centrality of language in analytic philosophy. While Quine’s critique pushed the discipline toward greater engagement with empirical science and naturalism, Grice and Strawson’s defense reflects a belief in the enduring importance of linguistic analysis.

2. The Status of Conceptual Analysis:
   If Quine’s rejection of the analytic-synthetic distinction had been widely accepted, it would have posed a significant challenge to the entire project of conceptual analysis, which relies on the belief that certain truths are discoverable through analysis of language and meaning.

3. Continuity and Change in Philosophy:
   Finally, this debate illustrates a tension between continuity in philosophical methods and the openness to change in light of scientific advancements. While Grice and Strawson defend a traditional philosophical distinction, Quine’s critique opened the door to new ways of thinking about the relationship between language, knowledge, and reality.

Process Flow:
Grice-Strawson defend analyticity → Quine critiques analyticity → Grice-Strawson respond with pragmatic utility → Debate influences broader analytic philosophy trajectory

Final Reflection

The exchange between Grice, Strawson, and Quine remains a foundational moment in analytic philosophy. While Quine’s critique has had a lasting impact, the defense mounted by Grice and Strawson preserved important tools for conceptual analysis and continues to inform debates in epistemology and the philosophy of language.

MCQ: What is the central argument of Grice and Strawson in In Defense of a Dogma?

1. Rejecting the importance of the analytic-synthetic distinction
2. Arguing that Quine’s empirical holism is correct
3. Defending the analytic-synthetic distinction based on its practical utility
4. Claiming that language has no role in philosophical analysis
   Correct Answer: 3